

VZCZCXRO2102

OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHC #3272/01 2422115
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 292112Z AUG 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 5461
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 3309
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 9114
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 7620
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 5754
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 6455
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 6077
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2922

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 093272

SIPDIS, SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [EUN](#) [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [GG](#) [RU](#)

SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU ON NON-GEORGIA TOPICS IN
ADVANCE OF THE SEPTEMBER 5-6 FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING
(GYMNICH)

[11](#). (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 11.

[12](#). (SBU) Summary: EU Foreign Ministers will hold an informal "Gymnich" meeting in Avignon on September 5-6. We expect the agenda to include: Georgia and EU/Russia relations, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, updating the 2003 EU Security Strategy, Transatlantic Relations, and, time permitting, Serbia and Afghanistan/Pakistan. This cable contains guidance only on the non-Georgia agenda items; guidance on Georgia and EU/Russia relations will be sent septel. Posts in EU member states are requested to approach host governments as soon as possible at the appropriate level to convey U.S. views on these topics. Posts are requested to include the SIPDIS caption on their response cables. A background section covering some of these issues is provided prior to a section containing talking points. Points are to be delivered to EU members and Brussels institutions only. Other posts should not/not deliver these points.

BACKGROUND

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

[13](#). (SBU) Despite the fluid political dynamics in Israel and in the Palestinian territories and the public's perception of a lack of progress in the negotiations, we must respect the parties' consistent reports that the negotiations remain professional and substantive and that advances on core issues are being made. The parties are clear that they do not intend to settle for a provisional agreement and that all issues will be addressed in the final agreement.

[14](#). (SBU) The parties continue to affirm their ongoing belief that the current negotiating framework is effective and that they intend to proceed in their discussions based on the current structure. They emphasize the importance of sustaining confidentiality in the negotiations in order to maintain the process' integrity and underscore their commitment to reaching a comprehensive agreement that establishes a Palestinian state.

[15](#). (SBU) It is imperative that the international community's support of the negotiations is coordinated through the Quartet and that unhelpful intervention is avoided. Unfocused activism risks diluting international

efforts and could jeopardize this sensitive process. Premature action in the UN Security Council on a select set of issues, for example, will contravene the parties' efforts to reach a comprehensive agreement.

¶16. (SBU) While the parties continue to welcome the support of the international community, they are not interested in direct international intervention in the substance of their discussions or outside proposals.

EU SECURITY STRATEGY

¶17. (SBU) The French have made updating the 2003 EU Security Strategy (EUSS) a priority for their current EU presidency. The EUSS identifies many of the same threats to Europe as the U.S. National Security Strategy identifies for the U.S., e.g., international terrorism, proliferation, failed states. Given the political support for a strengthened European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) that exists in many member states, and consequent influence of an updated EUSS on policy priorities, it is important that the U.S. and the EU continue to share a vision as to the threats faced by our societies.

STATE 00093272 002 OF 004

¶18. (SBU) "Transatlantic relations" will be on the agenda for the September 5-6 EU Foreign Ministers' Gymnich meeting in Avignon. We understand this is intended to be a political assessment of U.S.-EU relations in view of the upcoming U.S. presidential elections, and an inventory of subjects on which the U.S. and EU will need a shared vision. A June statement by French FM Kouchner, Spanish FM Moratinos, and Portuguese FM Amado noted four broad areas for discussion: restoring "universal values" (e.g., Guantanamo, death penalty); enhancing the dialogue on NATO transformation, Afghanistan, and WMD/nonproliferation (Iran), while constructing a real European defense; strengthening the EU role in the Middle East peace process; and building a strategic dialogue on financial flows, energy security, food supply, and poverty. We understand that Russia will be added to this list. We should discourage focus on "universal value" issues where Europe seeks to export aspects of its legal system to which we could not conform for constitutional reasons even if we were so inclined. For example, absent constitutional amendments, we could not adopt European approaches on the death penalty, on the legal framework for preventative detention of terror suspects (their civil law affords them authorities that in our system fall within military legal frameworks, and they accept restrictions on freedom of expression that would be

unconstitutional in the U.S.) Focus on these issues will consequently be divisive and unproductive.

SERBIA

¶19. (SBU) Although President Tadic has replaced some hard-liners and dialed-back the rhetoric, Serbia's Kosovo policy still largely tracks that of former Prime Minister Kostunica's. For example, Serbia still opposes EULEX deployment in Kosovo without a new UNSCR and continues to promote rejectionist parallel institutions in the Kosovo Serb community. Serbia's effort to seek an UNGA referral on Kosovo to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is out of step with its Euro-Atlantic ambitions.

AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN

¶10. (SBU) The United States remains concerned about the security situation along Pakistan's western frontier, particularly in and around the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that allows extremists to orchestrate operations across the border in Afghanistan and beyond. An additional layer of complication is the continuing tensions between Kabul and Islamabad, the result of various security incidents this year. The United States remains committed over the long-term to helping alleviate problems in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Without a collective international effort, however, it will be difficult to contain the existing threat emanating from border region.

¶11. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Please deliver the following points to the appropriate MFA official(s) as soon as possible (in advance of September 5-6 Gymnich).

BEGIN NON-PAPER TEXT

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

--We welcome your views on ways that the international community could, in consultation with the parties, add precision to its role in supporting the negotiations, without jeopardizing the integrity of this sensitive process.

STATE 00093272 003 OF 004

SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU ON NON-GEORGIA TOPICS IN ADVANCE OF THE SEPTEMBER 5-6 FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GYMNIC

--Efforts to facilitate dialogue among the Palestinian factions must concentrate on reinstating the legitimate PA institutions in both the West Bank and Gaza. Sustainable political arrangements in the West Bank and Gaza must be based on the Quartet principals: renunciation of violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of past agreements between the parties.

EU SECURITY STRATEGY

--We note the EU's interest in updating its 2003 security strategy. We believe that the U.S. and EU member states confront many of the same threats and challenges, and welcome an open dialogue with you on the direction of your discussions, with a view to fostering a shared transatlantic vision.

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

-- We understand transatlantic relations will be on the Gymnich agenda, to include an assessment of priorities in view of the upcoming U.S. elections. We expect that maintaining strong transatlantic relations will be a key priority for whichever administration succeeds the current one.

--In our view, transatlantic relations are best when we focus on meeting common threats, such as terrorism, energy security, and aggressive Russian behavior, and not when we focus on issues where there are inherent differences in our two legal systems. We would appreciate your perspective on which issues will most require a joint approach.

SERBIA

--ICJ Case: Serbia's pursuit of an ICJ advisory opinion request from the UNGA is inconsistent with Serbia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations. We do not believe that Kosovo's independence - or the steps the international community has taken in response - were unlawful. But we are concerned that an ICJ referral will delay progress on the ground, and in international recognition foster division, and may result in unpredictable opinions that may be destabilizing and could inadvertently set precedents that reach far beyond the Balkans and Europe.

--EULEX: We urge EU members to demonstrate strength and capacity to execute the full EULEX mandate. A EULEX presence in the north is critical, while recognizing EULEX may have to gradually ramp up in the north. A robust EULEX presence in Serb enclaves south of the Ibar is critical to limit separatist tendencies there. We need EU capitals to fill EULEX personnel shortfalls, especially in Police Units for the North. Tadic needs to hear clearly from the EU and from EU Member States that Serbia should end its opposition to EULEX and to its deployment throughout Kosovo, especially in the north and along the border. Belgrade needs to hear that its effort to draw closer to Brussels will be impacted by Serbia's actions toward Kosovo, particularly EULEX in the north.

AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN

--We would like to work with our EU partners to develop the economy in the Tribal Areas, continue military operations in the Northwest Frontier Province and the Tribal areas, and strengthen Pakistan's cross-border relationship with Afghanistan.

-- The USG is committed to supporting the Afghan Government's request to expand the Afghan National Army. The international community's support for sustaining the Afghan National Army is needed.

STATE 00093272 004 OF 004

SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU ON NON-GEORGIA TOPICS IN ADVANCE OF THE SEPTEMBER 5-6 FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GYMNIC

-- We encourage our EU partners to carefully align their generous pledges from the June 12 Paris Conference to the Afghan National Development Strategy and transparently report their spending plans to the Afghan Ministry of Finance and UNAMA. This information is critical to improve aid effectiveness and help the Afghan Government build a budget that fulfills the plan we all pledged to support.

END NON-PAPER TEXT
RICE